The Sober Joy of Thieving by Stob, Jennifer
Criticism
Volume 57 | Issue 1 Article 8
2015
The Sober Joy of Thieving
Jennifer Stob
Texas State University, jennifer.stob@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism
Part of the Comparative Literature Commons, Contemporary Art Commons, Fine Arts
Commons, and the Modern Art and Architecture Commons
Recommended Citation
Stob, Jennifer (2015) "The Sober Joy of Thieving," Criticism: Vol. 57: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism/vol57/iss1/8
 151Criticism Winter 2015, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 151–157. ISSN 0011-1589.
© 2015 by Wayne State University Press, Detroit, Michigan 48201-1309
THE SOBER JOY OF 
THIEVING
Jennifer Stob
Radical Prototypes: Allan Kaprow 
and the Invention of Happenings by 
Judith F. Rodenbeck. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2011. Pp. 312, 
47 illustrations. $34.95 cloth, 
$17.95 paper.
“The Museum gives us a thieves’ 
conscience,” begins Judith F. 
Rodenbeck’s excellent Radical 
Prototypes: Allan Kaprow and 
the Invention of Happenings (ii). 
The aphorism is from “Indirect 
Language and the Voices of 
Silence,” one of the central texts that 
mark phenomenologist Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s engagement 
with aesthetic theory.1 Originally 
published in 1952 in Les Temps 
Modernes, the literary journal syn-
onymous with left-leaning, post-
war Continental intellectualism, 
Merleau-Ponty’s essay takes issue 
with the way our perception of art 
is institutionalized.2 He critiques 
not only our conventional histori-
cal understanding of artistic style 
but also the conventional reception 
framework that museums offer 
us; both, he proclaims, deaden our 
experience of artworks and restrict 
their ability to truly extend our vis-
ible world. The museum in partic-
ular disappoints because it too often 
serves as a “meditative necropolis” 
for artworks rather than a contex-
tual “historicity of life” for them.3 In 
their standard form, they compel us 
to appraise and consume art retro-
spectively as a collection of objects, 
sculptures, and canvases in artifi-
cial communion. We as a  society 
have invented these museum envi-
ronments, and therefore our art 
viewing is tainted by this act of 
stealing artworks from artists and 
from their naturally evolving con-
text. Merleau-Ponty suggests that, 
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paradoxically, the very museums 
we visit with “a somewhat spurious 
reverence” inevitably produce in us 
a “thieves’ conscience.”4
Radical Prototypes turns 
Merleau-Ponty’s dictum on its head. 
Rodenbeck evokes it convention-
ally in her first chapter, describing 
the guilty conscience that accompa-
nies her own art history of an artis-
tic practice as ephemeral, marginal, 
and resistant to institutional display 
as happenings. Conceived by artist 
Allan Kaprow in 1958, happenings 
were a kind of performance art 
that resisted theatrical performa-
tivity and sought instead to blur the 
definitional boundaries between 
creator, performer, spectator, and 
participant. Carefully organized 
and scored, happenings were nev-
ertheless nonnarrative events; 
throughout the 1960s, Kaprow 
and others depended increasingly 
on improvisation and the unex-
pected as key factors of this process- 
oriented, open art form. Perhaps 
to spite this guilty conscience, 
Rodenbeck refashions the mean-
ing of Merleau-Ponty’s dictum in 
the six chapters that follow, using 
this appropriation to frame her 
discussion of an entirely different 
relationship between art and theft 
in the 1960s. The book positions 
artist Allan Kaprow and those who 
took up the artistic practice of hap-
penings he pioneered as exemplars 
of an artistic thieves’ conscience in 
action. Happenings arose out of a 
keen interest in reconstituting some 
of the formal, artifactual evidence 
left by the 1920s avant-gardes. In 
its failure or its success, this figu-
rative reconstitution was a base 
from which artists like Kaprow, 
Jim Dine, Claes Oldenburg, Robert 
Whitman, and Red Grooms could 
depart in the elaboration of their 
own artistic projects. Stripped of 
Merleau-Ponty’s moralizing over-
tone, the guiding thieves’ con-
science that Rodenbeck locates in 
happenings inflected this collage-
inspired performance paradigm 
with multiplicity instead of duplic-
ity, subversion instead of guilt, and 
transparency instead of secrecy. 
Happenings are positioned as a 
kind of transitional aesthetic thiev-
ery. They occupy the definitional 
boundary between modernist 
détournement (a politicized practice 
of appropriation) and neutral post-
modernist pastiche.
With her narrative, Rodenbeck 
deliberately sidesteps the dualism 
of formalism and the avant-garde 
that has dominated many of the art 
historical narratives of the 1960s. 
If happenings are best character-
ized as intermediary, open-ended, 
relational, and interdisciplinary, 
then their historicization would 
do well to reflect this, she reasons. 
Her book calls for and models a 
scholarly “matrix through which to 
approach a generation of postwar 
artistic efforts” (27). Her contribu-
tion lies in a series of individual 
“material, rhetorical, and discur-
sive” histories (18) that enhance our 
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understanding of what happenings 
were and what they aspired to be. 
The wealth of material on the soci-
ological climates, the architectural 
practices, the technological meta-
phors, the theatrical methodologies, 
and the photographic conditions 
that surrounded happenings acts 
like connective tissue, shaping and 
securing them within art history. 
In this sense, then, the art histori-
cal matrix to which Rodenbeck 
contributes should be thought of 
as a sort of expanded field for hap-
penings where the artworks of 
Kaprow and company are no lon-
ger contrasted with painting alone 
but with all other experimental 
intermedia and the areas of inquiry 
intermedia shares: the everyday, 
the aleatory, and the participatory.
Measured and formal in tone, 
preeminently readable at the same 
time, Rodenbeck’s book is often like 
an unexpected treasure hunt amidst 
the presumed familiar. “Let’s look 
for traces of civilization!” the trio 
in François Truffaut’s Jules et Jim 
(1962) exclaim delightedly to one 
another as they wander through a 
wooded area to the beach. Readers 
of Rodenbeck’s histories are led 
to wander, too, finding known 
documents, theories, and artworks 
linked freshly and illuminat-
ingly to one another. The chapters 
“Creative Acts of Consumption, or 
Death in Venice” and “The Black 
Box” are in this sense exemplary. 
The former features an impressive 
synopsis of the activities and aims 
of the International Congresses 
of Modern Architecture (CIAM). 
This, along with a discussion of 
the work of sociologist David 
Riesman, helps articulate the 
space—“purposive though almost 
aimless” (63), as Kaprow wrote in 
1967—that a cluster of happen-
ings activated in the early 1960s: 
Oldenburg’s The Store (1961), 
Gerhard Richter and Konrad 
Lueg’s Leben mit Pop (Living 
with pop, 1963), and Kaprow’s 
Bon Marché (1963). In the latter 
chapter, the infamous black box 
of both contemporary theater and 
complex electronics is brilliantly 
posited as a metaphoric “overde-
termined bachelor machine” (80) 
for artists involved with happen-
ings, minimalism, and Fluxus (an 
international network of artists 
united by their interest in chance, 
live performance, and collaborative 
projects in the early 1960s through 
the 1970s). It provided a site of phe-
nomenological exploration where 
blank surface, technological con-
struction, and existential interior 
could be triangulated.
Perhaps because of the very lack 
to which it points, “Generation 
Gaps,” the first chapter of Radical 
Prototypes, is the book’s most mod-
est offering: it extends the preface, 
giving an overview of the lacunae 
in art history after 1945 that con-
tribute to our presently limited 
understanding of happenings. Art 
historians don’t know the particu-
lars of the passage from neo-Dada 
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to pop to minimalism to interme-
dia, and although privileged cul-
tural moments are attributed to 
conceptual art, performance art, 
and photography, practically no 
scholarship speaks knowledgeably 
to their prehistories (5–6). Theorists 
like Guy Debord and Herbert 
Marcuse must have been impactful 
on American intermedia artists, but 
we can’t specifically trace how, and 
the secondary theoretical discourses 
thus far developed to examine art 
of the 1960s (psychoanalytic theory 
among them) don’t seem sufficient 
to contextualize happenings (7, 22). 
These observations speak to the 
necessity of the contingent project 
of constructing an art historical 
matrix rather than a genealogical 
tree or flowchart. While the gaps 
Rodenbeck identifies won’t ever 
be hermetically sealed—nor could 
they be—contemporary art histo-
rians continue to introduce criti-
cal missing knowledge to the field 
(subjective testimonies, painstak-
ingly researched exhibition histo-
ries, archive-supported time lines, 
and even rigorous formal analy-
ses) as affixed nodes upon which a 
matrix like Rodenbeck’s can be fur-
ther extended.
Radical Prototypes assumes a 
solid knowledge of the American 
art world in the 1960s; it takes as 
its point of departure the basic 
descriptive material on happen-
ings provided in texts by Kaprow, 
like Assemblage, Environments & 
Happenings (1966) and Essays on 
the Blurring of Art and Life (1993), 
as well as secondary literature like 
Childsplay: The Art of Allan Kaprow 
(2004) and Allan Kaprow—Art 
as Life (2008).5 Rodenbeck often 
provides exceptionally helpful 
background information omit-
ted in these former works. For 
example, she carefully discusses 
John Dewey’s pragmatism and 
reads the paradigm of happenings 
against Fluxus pieces. In some 
chapters, however, readers would 
benefit from even more recap 
of constitutive artistic elements, 
especially in cases where images 
are reproduced but not directly 
referenced or contextualized. 
Nevertheless, the advantages of 
this approach are clear, affording 
Rodenbeck ample space in which 
to thoroughly explore the contrast 
between Judith Malina and Julian 
Beck’s Living Theatre and hap-
penings (“Madness and Method”) 
and the antinomies of happenings 
that took indexical mediation as 
a key performance motif (“Car 
Crash, 1960” and “Foil”).
As the book’s title suggests, 
Allan Kaprow conceived of hap-
penings as radical prototypes: 
radical in the critique that their 
frequently destabilizing, negative, 
or ambivalent model of subjectivity 
and society contained, and proto-
typical in the enormous influence 
they have exercised on more con-
temporary artistic paradigms such 
as installation art, performance art, 
and relational art (xi). The radical 
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and prototypical nature of happen-
ings has crossed over into contem-
porary popular culture as slang and 
has been mediatized through film, 
television, and pop fiction. The 
forms of resistance built into hap-
penings (resistance “to documen-
tation, to memory, to the market, 
and even to their own codification” 
[ix]) have too long been neglected 
or misinterpreted by art historians 
and curators. Rodenbeck’s book 
redresses this. While never accu-
satory, the final chapter of Radical 
Prototypes, entitled “Participation,” 
gestures meaningfully in the direc-
tion of curator, art critic, and art 
administrator Nicolas Bourriaud.
Bourriaud introduced his cura-
torial concept of relational aesthetics 
to art criticism with his collection of 
essays entitled Relational Aesthetics, 
published in English translation in 
1998.6 Relational Aesthetics gener-
ated well-deserved controversy in 
the 2000s on several counts. Several 
art historians (Claire Bishop chief 
among them) noted Bourriaud’s 
problematic disinterest in histori-
cizing the contemporary art that he 
claims makes use of social relations 
as its fundamental medium. This 
disinterest is likely the cause of his 
oversight of important dynamics 
of agency and power within such 
artworks. Finally, many critics 
objected to Bourriaud’s sugges-
tion that relational art offers us an 
“interstice” in the Marxian sense (an 
enclave or zone of exception from 
our dominant economic system 
and the social relations it condi-
tions).7 Rodenbeck concurs with 
the critiques leveled at Relational 
Aesthetics, calling Bourriaud’s 
assignation of what is relational 
in art a “self-ratifying tautology” 
(252). More compellingly, she raises 
the question of why Bourriaud’s 
narrative elides artworks of the 
1960s, such as happenings, in favor 
of 1990s artworks.
According to Rodenbeck, the 
answer should be sought in the 
careful differentiation of what 
participation can actually mean. 
The participation solicited in hap-
penings is synonymous with what 
Umberto Eco in his 1962 text 
The Open Work termed an “ori-
ented insertion” (248). Relational 
Aesthetics, on the other hand, 
describes artworks that certainly 
allow spectators to participate 
with their bodies and minds, but 
not, ultimately, to potentially re-
code and reconfigure the work the 
way an oriented insertion would. 
Bourriaud, as well as his critics, 
mostly leave the relational art avant 
la lettre of the 1960s aside when 
debating what art of the 1990s 
can or cannot contestationally do. 
In this sense, both sides may have 
missed the nuances of this earlier 
art’s contestational desires. These 
nuances are crucial: Rodenbeck 
claims that happenings and their 
participants performed the very 
doubt that art could continue to 
bring a social interstice like the one 
Bourriaud invokes into existence.
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Happenings, she writes, “were 
addressed to the vanishing of pre-
cisely the possibility of this kind 
of experience from the horizon of 
perceiving subjects. Indeed, they 
were addressed to the obsoles-
cence of this experience’s  subject” 
(245). As radical prototypes, they 
resisted commemoration and 
institutionalization, but darkly: 
Kaprow was aware of happen-
ings’ inability to resist the larger 
triad of culture industry, capital-
ism, and mediation in such a way 
that would have taken happenings 
out of an aesthetic framework and 
aligned them with the situations 
of the leftist postwar avant-garde, 
the Situationist International. In 
Rodenbeck’s reading, Kaprow 
and other practitioners of hap-
penings could only agree with the 
Situationists’ appraisal of their art. 
Happenings, the Situationists wrote 
in 1963, are “an isolated attempt to 
construct a situation on the basis of 
 poverty (material poverty, poverty 
of human contact, poverty inher-
ited from the artistic spectacle, 
poverty of the specific philosophy 
driven to ‘ideologize’ the reality of 
these moments).”8
Having charted the transi-
tions of happenings—Kaprow’s 
and others—Rodenbeck’s book 
finishes with the thought that, in 
them, we see experience affirmed 
as “an act of attention” (245). This 
is once again a celebration of the 
appropriated thieves’ conscience 
in art that inspired a redescription 
and rearticulation of conventional 
society in the 1960s. Indeed, this 
is exactly what creates the contex-
tual historicity of life that Merleau-
Ponty longs for in his 1952 text. 
He laments our museumgoing 
with thieves’ consciences, suggest-
ing we should instead go “in the 
sober joy of work,”9 as painters do. 
Rodenbeck’s book is an important 
contribution to the larger historical 
project that reminds us that artistic 
thieving, redescribing, and reart-
iculating in the name of social cri-
tique are themselves sober joys.
Jennifer Stob is assistant professor of art 
 history in the School of Art and Design at 
Texas State University. Her scholarship 
focuses on the intersection of  contemporary 
art, experimental cinema and artists’ 
video, particularly the place of film in the 
Situationist International and the Austria 
Filmmaker’s Cooperative. Her work has 
been published in Evental Aesthetics, 
Moving Image Review and Art Journal 
(MIRAJ), Parallax, and Studies in French 
Cinema.
NOTES
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Signs, trans. 
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Studies in Phenomenology and 
Existential Philosophy (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 
1964); The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics 
Reader: Philosophy and Painting, 
trans. and ed. Michael B. Smith, 
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Existential Philosophy (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1993); 
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Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor, 
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